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As members of a global community, citizens of every country believe
in fundamental rights that define who they are and how they shall live in
society. Among a varied list of beliefs and ideologies, a recurrent right to
health is intrinsic to the way people live and die. However, an extreme
diversity exists in the health of the global community. As developing
nations continue to struggle toward modern advances in economics,
politics, and culture, the demand for the health of nations cannot be
ignored. Indeed, as the earth evolves as a global community, the
international focus of health is not only beneficial but a necessity.
Fortunately, the international forefathers recognized the need and
benefits of global health. The first of numerous historical international
discussions on global health began in 1851.1 In 1945, the United Nations
became the international funnel for the majority of global problems. It
quickly adopted the World Health Organization (WHO) under Article 57
of the U.N. Charter, delegating international responsibility to take action
2
on emerging health concerns applicable under WHO's Constitution.Today, WHO remains the predominant figure that guides, monitors,
tJ.D., University of Tulsa College of Law, Tulsa, Oklahoma, May 2003; B.A., Criminal
Justice/Sociology, B.A., Spanish, St. Louis University, St. Louis, Missouri, May 2000. The
author wishes to dedicate this comment to his parents, James M. Volansky & Judith A.
Volansky, in gratitude for a lifetime of unconditional support and encouragement.
1. See David P. Fidler, The Future of the World Health Organization: What Role for
International Law? 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1079, 1083 (1998). The International
Sanitary Conference met in 1851 to discuss quarantine measures due to cholera epidemics.
Previously, the quarantine measures by numerous individual European countries severely
affected international trade. Id. at 1083-84.
2. Agreement between the United Nations and the World Health Organization, Nov.
12, 1948, art. I, VI U.N.T.S. 193, 194.
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teaches, and even regulates Member States on global health. Its image is
monumental, but its implementation is leading the World Health
Organization to a slow death.
From its inception, the WHO Constitution provided the organization
with broad international legal powers to further its goals.3 However,
numerous health scholars criticize the resistance of WHO to use its
international authority more fully and its lack of enforcement of existingS 4
international health regulations. Member States are eager to offer their
criticism of the current status of health regulations, but hesitate to accept
responsibility for the growing problem. Just as global health is an
international concern, the solution will require international cooperation
and a new vision to attain the desired outcome.
This comment focuses on WHO and its approach to international
health law. Part II examines the fundamental problem of health in a world
of differing economies and priorities and Part III examines the
organizational components of WHO and how they are responsible for the
implementation of health policy. Next, Part IV discusses WHO's specific
utilization of international authority, and Part V weighes WHO's
effectiveness in the global community. Finally, Part VI looks to the future
of global health and the emerging philosophy of global health
jurisprudence in rendering a successful outcome, both for the people of the
world and for WHO's mission.
II. A HEALTHY WORLD TODAY?
A. Defining Health as a Right
A clear definition of health and its implications must be established
before any discussion on the state of health in the world can begin.
Common international understandings of health and an individual's right
to health come from a variety of sources.5 Under the WHO Constitution:
3. See Constitution of the World Health Organization, opened for signature July 22,
1946, art. 19, 21, 62 Stat. 2679, 2685, 14 U.N.T.S. 185, 192-93 [hereinafter WHO
Constitution].
4. See David P. Fidler, Mission Impossible? International Law and Infectious Diseases,
10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 493,495-96 n.19 (1996).
5. See generally Steven D. Jamar, The International Human Right to Health, 22 S.U. L.
REV. 1, 17-33 (1994). Among the documents that collectively define a right to health in an
international perspective are:
[T]he United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the Convention on Economic, Social, & Cultural Rights, the
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the
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Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and
not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.
The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the
fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race,
religion, political belief, economic or social condition.
The health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and
security and is dependent upon the fullest co-operation of individuals
and States.
The achievement of any State in the promotion and protection of health
is of value to all.
Unequal development in different countries in the promotion of health
and control of disease, especially communicable disease, is a common
danger.
Healthy development of the child is of basic importance; the ability to
live harmoniously in a changing total environment is essential to such
development.
The extension to all peoples of the benefits of medical, psychological
and related knowledge is essential to the fullest attainment of health.
Informed opinion and active co-operation on the part of the public are
of the utmost importance in the improvement of the health of the
people.
Governments have a responsibility for the health of their peoples which
can be fulfilled only by the provision of adequate health and social
6
measures.
Health is a right that must be an essential part of every culture and
represents a legal obligation for nations to abide by as a part of
fundamental human rights law.7 The problem, however, is that society
recognizes health in a broader context. The right to health needs to reflect
the notion that health is more than the mere absence of disease."
Individual good health and the right to health care are not synonymous
with a right to health.9 While an Afghan might marvel at disease-free
communities or routine vaccinations for children, an American would
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Id. at 19 (footnotes omitted).
6. WHO Constitution, supra note 3, pmbl., 62 Stat. at 2680, 14 U.N.T.S. at 186.
7. Allyn Lise Taylor, Making the World Health Organization Work: A Legal
Framework for Universal Access to the Conditions for Health, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 301, 309
(1992).
8. Jamar, supra note 5, at 11.
9. Taylor, supra note 7, at 310-11. Recognizing that a right to health does not
encompass all commonly understood components. See id.
2002]
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undoubtedly demand much more. To this end, the effective
implementation of a right to health is unbalanced. It is noteworthy that
the right to health is an evolving concept that changes within societies over
time, as do the obligations of governments.' °
Beyond its constitutional definition, WHO's pronouncements provide
little guidance on what a right to health should specifically encompass."
However, it has been suggested that health is a human right and states
should be legally bound to do something to effectuate that right.
Defining each state's particular steps to achieve a right to health is difficult
due to the diversity of conditions in the world.3
The core right thus includes as primary attributes at least that
governments do the following: insure provisions of universal coverage of
a base level of medical care benefits; do not prevent access to health
information; take steps to educate the public; and act to protect public
14health through various initiatives ....
When a concrete standard to judge a state is established," "the right to
health could well give rise to a justiciable claim of a state's violation of its
duty."16
B. Global Health Situation
The global health situation is undoubtedly better now than in the
past. 7 Since WHO began its mission in the 1940s, a general reduction in
disease and an increase in overall health is statistically undeniable. For
example, in 1975, WHO expected only 60% of the combined population of
all its Member States to live past sixty years."x In 1995, WHO expected
86% of the combined population of its Member States to live past sixty
years. By 2025, WHO projects that 96% of the combined population of
10. Id. at 311.
11. Jamar, supra note 5, at 44.
12. Id. at 34.
13. Id. at 52.
14. Id. at 5.
15. Id. at 3.
16. Id. at 4.
17. See Taylor, supra note 7, at 304.
18. See id. Review of health statistics concerning WHO published in the American
Journal of Law & Medicine shows an overall increase in the quality of health revealed by
increased life expectancy and decreased infant, child, and maternal mortality rates. Id.
19. THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1998: LIFE IN




its Member States will live past sixty years.2' Additionally, for over fifty
years WHO spent considerable efforts on infectious disease control of
smallpox, yellow fever, and cholera.2n While many diseases are of great
concern for WHO, the organization heralds among its accomplishments
the global eradication of smallpox in 1980 after thirteen years of effort.23
Any accomplishments for which WHO is recognized are quickly
tempered by the Director-General. On May 14, 2001, the Director-
General, Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland, addressed the delegates to the fifty-
fourth World Health Assembly.24  While the Director-General
acknowledged the superior work that WHO and its Member States
provide, she urged the Assembly to recognize the continued health
problems resulting from infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, malaria,
and HIV, the burdens of mental illness and neurological disorders, and the
grave impact of tobacco. 5 The victory towards global health appears to be
an endless task as newer health problems inhibit universal health for
everyone.
WHO recognizes that the health of the world is disturbingly off-
26balance. The disparity in health between developing countries and
advanced countries is marked by ongoing poverty of one-quarter of the
world's population."
Low incomes mean limited capacity to save and invest, limited means
for obtaining health services, high risk of personal illness, limitations on
mobility, and limited access to education, information and training.
Poor parents cannot provide their children with the opportunities for
better health and education to improve their lot. Lack of motivation,
hope and incentives creates a barrier to growth, and poverty is passed
from one generation to the next.28
21. Id.
22. See generally id. at 49.
23. Id.
24. Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland, Address by Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland, Director-
General to the Fifty-fourth World Health Assembly (May 14, 2001), available at
http://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/2001/english/20010514_wha54.html (last
visited Oct. 2, 2002).
25. Id.
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The most tragic victims of health deficiencies in developing countries
are children'9 as well as the mothers who bear them.3° Sharp contrasts
between developing countries and advanced countries reveal that only
30% of women in developing countries give birth in medical facilities,
where over 90% of women in advanced societies give birth in medical
facilities." Such poor health care at birth and extreme poverty are
responsible for the high infant morality rates throughout the world.
Furthermore, contaminated water supplies, poor sanitation, limited
immunizations, and plentiful diseases add to an already dangerous health
situation in impoverished countries. Attaining modern treatment for
diseases such as HIV/AIDS in developing countries is completely
unaffordable, leading to shorter lifespans among people with HIV/AIDS
33in developing countries than those in affluent countries.
IL1. THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
A. Historical Roots
WHO is currently the predominant international organizer of global
health with its international directives, but this has only been the case for
the last half century. As a response to the economic impact on trade and
maritime commerce, the International Sanitary Conference (ISC) was
created in 1851, and met repeatedly until 1938.34 Although initial strides
toward international legal obligations were slow, numerous agreements
(generally between North America and Europe) on human infectious
disease control and plant and animal diseases were created for the
protection of trade routes and reduced the chance of quarantines of
incoming foreign products." By 1924, four other international
organizations created a system of global health surveillance and formed
36international agreements based on scientific principles.
29. See Taylor, supra note 7, at 304. "[I]n developing countries, 40% of deaths are
estimated to occur among children under the age of fifteen, ten times the proportion in
developed countries." Id.
30. Id. at 305-06. "Five hundred thousand women, 99% of them in developing nations,
die each year from complications during pregnancy and delivery." Id.
31. THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1998, supra note 19, at 155.
32. See generally id. at 154-57.
33. David P. Fidler, "Geographical Morality" Revisited: International Relations,
International Law, and the Controversy over Placebo-Controlled HIV Clinical Trials in
Developing Countries, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 299, 300-01 (2001).
34. Fidler, supra note 1, at 1083-84.
35. Id. at 1084-85.
36. See id. at 1085-86. The international health organizations that were formed were: the
Pan-American Sanitary Bureau (1902), the International Office of Public Health (1907),
[Vol. 10.1
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In 1945, the United Nations was chartered with broad international
powers." Under Article 1 of the U.N. Charter, one of the organization's
purposes is "[t]o achieve international co-operation in solving
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian
character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and
for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion. Remaining consistent with this purpose, the
United Nations quickly exercised its power under Article 5739 and
chartered the World Health Organization.4 ' From these founding
principles, WHO, as an international agency dedicated to health,4'
currently gains notoriety due to its regional offices spanning the globe and
an annual budget currently at $1.8 billion dollars,42 contributed by its 193
Member States.43
B. Basis of International Authority
1. Functions of WHO
In order to achieve the "state of complete physical, mental and social
well-being," 44 the World Health Organization must provide a variety of
health-related functions. Article 2 of the WHO Constitution describes the
the Health Office of the League of Nations (1923), and the International Office of
Epizootics (1924). Id. at 1086.
37. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1-2.
38. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
39. U.N. CHARTER art. 57. Article 57 provides:
1.The various specialized agencies, established by intergovernmental
agreement and having wide international responsibilities, as defined in
their basic instruments, in economic, social, cultural, educational, health,
and related fields, shall be brought into relationship with the United
Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 63.
2. Such agencies thus brought into relationship with the United Nations
are hereinafter referred to as specialized agencies.
40. See Agreement between United Nations and World Health Organization, supra note
2, VI U.N.T.S. at 193.
41. See WHO Constitution, supra note 3, pmbl., 62 Stat. at 2680,14 U.N.T.S. at 186.
42. Allyn L. Taylor, An International Regulatory Strategy for Global Tobacco Control,
21 YALE J. INT'L L. 257, 278 (1996); Proposed Programme Budget 2000-2001 3, WHO Doc.
A52/INF.DOC./2 (Apr. 21, 2002), available at http://www.who.int/gb/EBWHA/PDF/
WHA52/ewid.pdf [hereinafter Proposed Programme Budget].
43. World Health Organization, Member States of the World Health Organization, at
http://www3.who.int/whosis/member-states/member-states.cfm?path=whosismember-stat
es&language=english (last visited Oct. 9, 2002).
44. WHO Constitution, supra note 3, pmbl., 62 Stat. at 2680, 14 U.N.T.S. at 186.
2002]
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twenty-two enumerated functions that guide the organization toward
providing the basic right to health throughout the world.45 While not all
functions are specifically relevant to the scope of this comment, the most
important functions include:
(a) to act as the directing and co-ordinating authority on international
health work;
(c) to assist governments, upon request, in strengthening health services;
(g) to stimulate and advance work to eradicate epidemic, endemic and
other diseases;
(k) to propose conventions, agreements and regulations, and make
recommendations with respect to international health matters and to
perform such duties as may be assigned thereby to the Organization and
are consistent with its objective;
(v) generally to take all necessary action to attain the objective of theS , 46
Organization.
With the implementation of such broad international health goals, WHO
serves as the primary advocate and leader to nations of the forementioned
basic human need and right to health.47
2. Organizational Hierarchy
The functions of WHO have obvious international impact when
WHO properly executes its legal power. WHO is composed of threeS 48
distinct components under Article 9 of its Constitution. First, the World
Health Assembly is composed of specialized national health delegates
from each of the Member States.49 The World Health Assembly meets
once every year and gives effect to the international health policies for
which WHO has responsibility under its Constitution. ° The most powerful
legislative authority of WHO is in Articles 19 and 21, but are rarely
45. See WHO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 2, 62 Stat. at 2681-82, 14 U.N.T.S. at 187-
89.
46. Id.
47. Taylor, supra note 7, at 302.
48. WHO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 9, 62 Stat. at 2683, 14 U.N.T.S. at 190. Article
9 provides that the World Health Assembly, the Executive Board, and the Secretariat shall
carry out of the work of the World Health Organization. Id.
49. WHO Constitution, supra note 3, arts. 10-11, 62 Stat. at 2683, 14 U.N.T.S. at 190.




utilized by the World Health Assembly."' Article 19 states in part, "[t]he
Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt conventions or agreements
,,12
with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization.
Additionally, Article 21 addresses more specific standards and procedures
that the Health Assembly can authorize." The broad legislative power
under Article 19 and the narrower legislative power under Article 21 will
become essential in the subsequent discussion of the effectiveness of
WHO's international power. WHO limits its use of legal power under
Articles 19 and 21, and instead issues extensive general recommendations
to Member States under Article 23."
The second body of WHO is the Executive Board. The Executive
Board consists of thirty-two individuals55 elected by the Member States,
who meet twice a year for a term of three years.56 The Executive Board
advises the World Health Assembly, but at the same time gives effect to
the policies of the World Health Assembly and takes emergency action
within the constitutional powers of the organization in times of health
emergencies such as epidemics.
51. Fidler, supra note 1, at 1089.
52. WHO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 19, 62 Stat. at 2685, 14 U.N.T.S. at 192.
53. See WHO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 21, 62 Stat. at 2685, 14 U.N.T.S. at 192-93.
Article 21 states:
The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt regulations
concerning:
(a) sanitary and quarantine requirements and other procedures designed
to prevent the international spread of disease;
(b) nomenclatures with respect to diseases, causes of death and public
health practices;
(c) standards with respect to diagnostic procedures for international use;
(d) standards with respect to the safety, purity and potency of biological,
pharmaceutical and similar products moving in international commerce;
(e) advertising and labelling of biological, pharmaceutical and similar
products moving in international commerce.
Id.
54. See David P. Fidler, Return of the Fourth Horseman: Emerging Infectious Diseases
and International Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 771, 837-38 (1997).
55. See THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1998, supra note 19, at 11. The original
Constitution under Article 24 only delegated eighteen people to the Executive Board.
WHO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 24, 62 Stat. at 2686, 14 U.N.T.S. at 193. This has
subsequently changed with increased membership in WHO. See THE WORLD HEALTH
REPORT 1998, supra note 19, at 11.
56. WHO Constitution, supra note 3, arts. 24-26, 62 Stat. at 2686, 14 U.N.T.S. at 193.
57. WHO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 28, 62 Stat. at 2686, 14 U.N.T.S. at 194.
2002]
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The third body of WHO is the Secretariat. The Secretariat is the daily
functional organ of WHO consisting of 3,500 experts in health-related
fields operating at its headquarters in Geneva, in the six regional offices ofS 58
WHO, and in individual countries. The head of the Secretariat is the
Director-General, appointed by the World Health Assembly and is the
"chief technical and administrative officer of the Organization. 5 9 The
entire organization has broad ranging abilities and goals, but despite its
composition of every major nation on earth,60 it maintains a high degree of
independence to promote its ends."
IV. WHO'S UTILIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY
A. Infectious Disease Control
61WHO, like its historical predecessors, was created largely to controlS 63
global infectious diseases. It has been suggested that "EIDs [Emerging
Infectious Diseases] represent one of the most serious threats to human
well-being in contemporary international relations." WHO is proud of its
accomplishments in infectious disease control such as the global
eradication of smallpox, reductions in plague, and a decline in epidemics
65
worldwide. Similarly, WHO reports significant reduction in numerous
other infectious diseases that have killed millions of people over the last
several decades.66 However, in recent years, infectious diseases have
61
returned with a fury. While there is some debate on the extent of
infection, experts have identified at least "twenty-nine new infectious
diseases and the re-emergence of twenty old infectious diseases since
1973. " WHO created the International Health Regulations (IHR) to
combat this ongoing dilemma, but they have been ineffective at containing
69the problem.
58. World Health Organization, Governance, at http://www.who.int/governance/en/ (last
visited Oct. 9, 2002).
59. WHO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 31, 62 Stat. at 2687, 14 U.N.T.S. at 194-95.
60. See WORLD HEALTH REPORT, supra note 19, at 13.
61. See WHO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 67, 62 Stat. at 2692, 14 U.N.T.S. at 201.
62. See Fidler, supra note 1, at 1083-85 (discussing numerous international organizations
and agreements formed in efforts to combat infectious disease).
63, WHO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 2(g), 62 Stat. at 2681, 14 U.N.T.S. at 188.
64, Fidler, supra note 4, at 494 (footnote omitted).
65. THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1998, supra note 19, at 49.
66. See generally id. at 49-57.
67. Fidler, supra note 4, at 494.
68. Id. (footnote omitted).
69. See id. at 497.
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WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
1. Emerging Infectious Diseases
Despite the historical advances made by WHO in infectious disease
control, infectious diseases are still responsible for a significant amount of
global illness.70 In 1996, the world's leading cause of death was infectious
diseases." Both new and old diseases have emerged due to high levels of
travel throughout the world, as well as international commerce that breeds
such diseases.72 Furthermore, over time, many diseases formed natural
resistances to the immunity many drugs provide to humans.73
While many "emerging infectious diseases" (EIDs) are prevalent
throughout the world, health experts consistently recognize several that
are most devastating. First, the HIV/AIDS crisis has become a worldwide
74
epidemic recognized by the nations of the world. By the end of 2000, 36.1
million people were living with AIDS worldwide and 21.8 million have
died from AIDS since the beginning of the pandemic.75 Fear from further
spread of such a deadly infectious disease leads many nations to turn away
infected travelers." As such, a response from WHO has been necessary to
limit the impact to AIDS victims.77 Likewise, tuberculosis (TB) reemerged
as the deadliest infectious disease.78 Experts estimated ninety million new
cases of TB during the 1990s.' 9 The impact of infectious disease is far
greater than the explanations above or the scope of this comment.
However, effective international health legislation is the best weapon to
effectuate a controlled response to HIV/AIDS, TB, and other infectious
disease epidemics worldwide.8°
70. THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1999: MAKING
A DIFFERENCE 19 (1999), available at http://www.who.int/whr/1999/en/pdf/Chapter2.pdf
(last visited Oct. 9, 2002).
71. Fidler, supra note 54, at 773.
72. Id. at 774-75.
73. See id. at 786-88.
74. Symposium, The AIDS Pandemic: International Travel and Immigration Restrictions
and the World Health Organization's Response, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 1043, 1051 (1988)
[hereinafter AIDS Symposium]. By the late 1980s, the World Summit of Health Ministers
recognized over 75,000 cases of AIDS. Id.
75. Fidler, supra note 33, at 300.
76. See AIDS Symposium, supra note 74, at 1052-55.
77. See id. at 1055-57.
78. Brian J. McCarthy, The World Health Organization and Infectious Disease Control:
Challenges in the Next Century, 4 DEPAUL INT'L L.J. 115, 119-20 (2000).
79. Id. at 120.
80. Michelle Forrest, Note, Using the Power of the World Health Organization: The
International Health Regulations and the Future of International Health Law, 33 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 153, 159 (2000).
20021
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
2. International Health Regulations
a. Powers of IHR
The International Health Regulations (IHR) is one the earliest
attempts by WHO to attain a grasp on the evolving world health situation.
WHO originally instituted the IHR in 1951 as the International Sanitary
Regulations (ISR)." As part of an effort to revise the ISR, the World
Heath Assembly renamed them the International Health Regulations in
1969.82 "The purpose of the International Health Regulations is to ensure
the maximum security against the international spread of diseases with a
minimum interference with world traffic." '83 To accomplish this goal, the
IHR describes a comprehensive surveillance program for Member States
to monitor and respond to infectious disease in their respective countries,
as it pertains to the specific diseases of the IHR.8
The IHR is limited to just three diseases. These diseases are: yellow
fever, plague, and cholera. 5 The IHR has three fundamental principles
that guide health administrations on these problematic diseases. First,
surveillance of a disease when initially detected is paramount to contain
disease transmission that could, if ignored, lead to the continued spread of
the disease."6 When one of the three infectious diseases is detected, the
health administration of a Member State must transmit that information to
WHO headquarters.87 The Member State has only twenty-four hours to
relay that information to WHO, which in turn advises other Member
States.8  These requirements provide rapid containment of a health
incident in a particular Member State and warns others of potential health
dangers. Additionally, international law requires each Member State to
81. Fidler, supra note 54, at 835.
82. Id. at 835-36.
83. World Health Organization, Foreward to International Health Regulations, at
http://policy.who.int/cgi-bin/om-isapi.dll?infobase=hreg&softpage=Browse-Frame-Pg42
(last visited Oct. 9, 2002) [hereinafter IHR Foreward].
84. Fidler, supra note 54, at 839.
85. International Health Regulations, opened for signature July 25, 1969, art. 1, 21 U.S.T.
3003, 3004-06,
764 U.N.T.S. 3, 4-12 [hereinafter IHR]. The original International Sanitary Regulations
included several other infectious diseases but were dropped in subsequent revisions. See
Fidler, supra note 54, at 839 n.344.
86. Fidler, supra note 54, at 839-40.
87. See IHR, supra note 85, arts. 2-13, 21 U.S.T. at 3006-09, 764 U.N.T.S. at 12-20.
88. IHR, supra note 85, art. 3, 21 U.S.T. at 3006, 764 U.N.T.S. at 12-14.
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make weekly reports to WHO during times of epidemics" and annual
reports relating to any cases subject to the IHR."
Second, the IHR establishes the procedures that individual
government health administrations must maintain before, during, and after
infectious disease outbreaks." To foster maximum security against
infectious diseases, the IHR requires that all ports and airports maintain
sanitary conditions, health personnel, and immediate procedures when
authorities believe there is a possible infection.92 The procedures require
non-discriminatory evaluation, surveillance, disinfection, and if absolutely
necessary, isolation of a visitor to a Member State suspected of disease
infection.93 These protective measures also prohibit infected persons and
cargo from departing a given location to minimize the spread of the three
IHR diseases. 94
The World Health Assembly adopted the IHR under the binding
regulations of Article 21.95 As such under Article 21, the IHR became
effective for all Member States unless they notified the "Director-General
of a rejection or reservations within a certain period of time ,96 under
Article 22. The problem argued by legal scholars is that the binding
regulations are more of a myth.97 Since Member States can "contract out"
of Article 21 legislation of the World Heath Assembly within a certain
time period, there is a question as to its effectiveness. 9
The objective of the IHR is surveillance of a potential health threat
relating to the three diseases of the text.99 However, the language of the
legislation itself reveals that as much as the regulations protect citizens of
Member States, it is also designed to protect trade and commerce
disruptions.' Article 29 is a controversial portion of the IHR, as it limits
89. IHR, supra note 85, art. 6, 21 U.S.T. at 3007, 764 U.N.T.S. at 14.
90. HR, supra note 85, art. 13,21 U.S.T. at 3009, 764 U.N.T.S. at 20.
91. See IHR, supra note 85, art. 3, 21 U.S.T. at 3006, 764 U.N.T.S. at 12-14.
92. See IHR, supra note 85, arts. 14-20, 21 U.S.T. at 3009-11, 764 U.N.T.S. at 20-26.
93. IHR, supra note 85, arts. 25-26, 28, 21 U.S.T. at 3012-13,764 U.N.T.S. at 28-30.
94. IHR, supra note 85, art. 31(1), 21 U.S.T. at 3014, 764 U.N.T.S. at 32.
95. See Fidler, supra note 54, at 837. The International Sanitary Regulations was the
original name of the International Health Regulations, only to be renamed later.
96. Id. at 836; see also WHO Constitution, supra note 3, arts. 21-22, 62 Stat. at 2685, 14
U.N.T.S. at 192-93.
97. See Fidler, supra note 54, at 836-38.
98. See id. at 838.
99. See id. at 844.
100. See IHR, supra note 85, art. 29, 21 U.S.T. at 3013, 764 U.N.T.S. at 32.
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the implementation of a country's emergency power."' Article 29
provides:
Except in case of an emergency constituting a grave danger to public
health, a ship or an aircraft, which is not infected or suspected of being
infected with a disease subject to the Regulations, shall not on account
of any other epidemic disease be refused free pratique by the health
authority for a port or an airport; in particular it shall not be prevented
from discharging or loading cargo or stores, or taking on fuel or water."'
Article 47 of the IHR requires that the health authority have "reason
to believe that the cargo and goods may have become contaminated by the
agent of a disease subject to the Regulations. '"10 3 The language of the
Article shows the strong prohibition by the drafters to inhibit trade
activities among nations.T M Furthermore, newspapers, books, and printed
material are not subject to any health measure, and postal parcels are only
subject to health measures in very specific instances.'0 5
In as much as the IHR pertains to commerce and trade, the legislation
essentially protects people. But the protection of the IHR is really
designed around infectious disease control of foreign visitors and
merchants.'0 6 The provisions of the IHR relate to controlling disease as it
enters a country or as it may leave.' ° The IHR permits the removal and
isolation of an infected person by the health authority of a country from
vehicles or vessels,'9 but it does not extend this isolation and removal
beyond the necessary time unless the risk of disease transmission is
extremely serious.1 9
b. Failure to Provide Significant Impact
International scholars and WHO representatives "agree that the IHR
have [sic] failed to ensure the maximum security against the international
spread of diseases with minimum interference with world traffic."'1 0 Noted
101. See Forrest, supra note 80, at 163-64.
102. IHR, supra note 85, art. 29, 21 U.S.T. at 3013, 764 U.N.T.S. at 32.
103. IHR, supra note 85, art. 47(1), 21 U.S.T. at 3018, 764 U.N.T.S. at 42.
104. See Forrest, supra note 80, at 163-64.
105. IHR, supra note 85, art. 49, 21 U.S.T. at 3018, 764 U.N.T.S. at 44.
106. See IHR, supra note 85, arts. 14-23, 21 U.S.T. at 3009-12, 764 U.N.T.S. at 20-28
(discussing sanitation, disease control measures, and on-sight medical staff required at ports
and airports).
107. See id.
108. IHR, supra note 85, art. 39, 21 U.S.T. 3016, 764 U.N.T.S. at 38.
109. IHR, supra note 85, art. 40(2), 21 U.S.T. 3016, 764 U.N.T.S. at 38.
110. Fidler, supra note 54, at 843.
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international legal scholar David Fidler has commented extensively on the
effectiveness of WHO and its programs over the years."' Both his analysis
and the analysis of others shed some light on the current status of the IHR.
First, Member States do not undertake appropriate surveillance of the
diseases in the IHR."2 The infrastructure of local health administrations in
many Member States is limited and ineffective because as infectious
diseases subject to the IHR arise, the local health infrastructure lacks
effective communication and surveillance to realize when a disease is
present and fails to report to WHOI-O
Second, the IHR only places surveillance and infection procedures on
three diseases--yellow fever, cholera, and plague."4 Health sources reveal
that as many as fifty diseases are significant and require monitoring by
• .• 115
health organizations. Even one of WHO's recent World Health Reports
describes twenty-three infectious diseases that currently affect millions of
people worldwide and are insufficiently treated.16  In 1998 alone, WHO
calculated 13.3 million people died from infectious diseases.11 7 Fidler notes
that the reasoning for limiting the IHR is related to outdated
understandings of infectious disease transmission."' In the past, yellow
fever, cholera, and plague were the only three diseases that scientists
believed posed an international health threat."9 Modern health statistics
show that infectious diseases have no boundaries and an international
health response to the wide range of infectious diseases is essential.2° It
seems apparent that in the modern global community, a modern global
response must be imposed upon the broader base of infectious diseases.
Third, the IHR is ineffective because neither the legislative powers of
the IHR, nor the powers of the WHO Constitution permit sanctions
''against a member state that fails to comply with a binding regulation
enacted under Article 21..12 WHO does not take affirmative action when
111. See id.; David P. Fidler, International Law and Global Public Health, 48 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1 (1999); Fidler, supra note 4; Fidler, supra note 1.
112. Fidler, supra note 54, at 844.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 845.
115. Forrest, supra note 80, at 165.
116. See generally THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1998, supra note 19, at 49-56.
117. World Health Organization, Communicable Diseases 2000: Highlights of Activities in
1999 and Major Challenges for the Future 1, available at http://www.who.int/infectious-
dieseases-news/CDS2000/PDF/cd2000-e.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2002).
118. See Fidler, supra note 54, at 844-45.
119. Id.
120. See Forrest, supra note 80, at 163.
121. Fidler, supra note 54, at 848.
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international health law is violated and at most will subject Member States
to dispute settlement procedures under Article 75 .122 Apparently, WHO
has realized its weakness in its own rules because over the past fifty years,
WHO has limited its legislative power to recommendations."' However,
as Fidler points out "[w]ithout formal enforcement powers... WHO may
have no alternative to this nonlegal approach. '24
Finally, the goal of the IHR "to ensure the maximum security against
the international spread of diseases with a minimum interference with
world traffic"''5 has produced just the opposite affect. 126 The international
perception of infectious diseases causes nations to resist reporting to WHO
in accordance with the IHR.127 A fear of reduction in trade, commerce,
and tourism provides strong incentive to many nations from reporting the
emergence of diseases. Nations with economic concerns will not take the
chance of further injury to themselves from disease reporting.129 Public
perception about infectious diseases produces fear of the possible
consequences of contact. The profound economic impact on various
Member States such as Peru, Great Britain, and India for reporting
infectious diseases in the past leads others to actively conceal disease
infection as long as possible. 30  As a response, other "member states
impos[ed] excessive measures in direct violation of the Regulations and
not justified by the medical situation. These measures included the closing
of airports to aircraft arriving from India and banning the importation of
Indian foodstuffs.,
131
122. See id.; see also WHO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 75, 62 Stat. at 2693, 14 U.N.T.S.
at 202.
123. See Fidler, supra note 54, at 848-49.
124. Id. at 848.
125. IHR Foreward, supra note 83 (emphasis added).
126. See Forrest, supra note 80, at 166-67.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 166.
130. See id. at 166-67. These nations have lost millions of dollars as a result of public
perception on infectious disease. Peru is said to have lost $700 million due to a cholera
outbreak in 1991 that severely reduced travel and trade. A plague outbreak in India in
1991 cost $1.7 billion in trade imbalance and the economic impact on Great Britain's beef
industry is still feeling the impact of "mad cow disease." Id. at 166-67. See also McCarthy,
supra note 78, at 126.
131. McCarthy, supra note 78, at 126 (footnotes omitted).
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3. The Revised IHR
In 1995, the forty-eighth session of the World Health Assembly
directed a resolution to the Director-General for revisions to the IHR.
132
Revisions to the IHR have been ongoing since that time. Preliminary
progress reports advise that the new IHR will consist of major alterations
in structure, notification, and increasing the diseases subject to
international law. 33 The ongoing changes to the IHR are a response to
ongoing criticism of their ineffectiveness.3 While WHO's Informal
Consultation that reviewed the IHR in 1995 noted that the IHR has lived
up to the invaluable purpose for which it was conceived,"' WHO publicly
recognized that "[a]s the world has changed and infectious diseases pose
new challenges, the IHR no longer meets the complex and ever-growing
risks of international spread of infectious diseases and emerging
infections.' 36 WHO's revision process has not been rapid. 137 The decision
to revise the IHR began in 1995, and a draft of the new IHR is intended to
be distributed in 2002, with submission to the World Health Assembly in
2004.1
38
There is still much skepticism about the exact content and final
product of the revised IHR, but international health commentators
consider the following points significant. 39  First, David Fidler draws
attention to "syndrome reporting.' 141 Syndrome reporting would require
Member States to immediately report to WHO defined syndromes that are
characteristic of certain diseases of international concern.1'1 Thereafter,
specific reports follow once health officials isolate the disease. 14' The
theory behind this approach is that local health infrastructures would not
have to identify diseases at great financial cost, as they would under the
current IHR. Syndrome reporting allows for broader resources to
132. Id. at 127.
133. Id.
134. See Fidler, supra note 54, at 851.
135. Id.
136. World Health Organization, Renewing the International Health Regulations, at
http://www.who.int/emc/IHR/IHREnglish.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2002).
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. See Fidler, supra note 54, at 851-67; Forrest, supra note 80, at 167-77; McCarthy,
supra note 78, at 126-31.
140. Fidler, supra note 54, at 851.
141. Id. at 852. The reportable syndromes would include "hemorrhagic fever, respiratory,
diarrheal, neurological, [and] jaundice . Forrest, supra note 80, at 167.
142. Fidler, supra note 54, at 852.
20021
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
understand the disease before its exact nature is known.' 43 However,
concern over the focus of this new legislation arises because it has not
addressed the problem of underreporting diseases that the current IHR
faces.1 " The broader disease concept of "syndromes" may cause confusion
by Member States on what diseases encompass the syndrome approach, or
on specific identification procedures.145
The broad syndrome approach of the revised IHR arguably ignores
urges by the health community to address specific infectious diseases
dramatically impacting the global community. The two reoccurring
diseases not addressed are TB and HIV/AIDS. The impact of these
diseases is rising at such an exponential rate146 that failure to include them
in the revised IHR may seriously undermine its purpose to "ensure the
maximum security against the international spread of diseases.' 47
Second, the revised IHR will include the ability for any official within
a Member State's government to report syndromes and not be limited
solely to health administrations.' 48 Furthermore, if Member States refuse
to comply with the IHR, WHO can still circulate information obtained
from non-governmental sources to all Members.9 There is concern that
giving such broad power to report on syndromes and diseases in
noncompliant Member States will cause even greater fear among other
nations due to the unfocused sources of information that such secondary
organizations may produce.
Third, education on the revised IHR will foster better execution of its
goals.151 The Informal Consultation's education plan includes guidelines
for infectious disease management,15' and a handbook on how to use and
apply the revised IHR.13 Despite the practical uses of such educational
measures, the recurrent problem of deficient public health infrastructures
in many countries is likely to inhibit the success of these educationalgoals.'5
143. Id.
144. Id. at 852-53.
145. Id. at 853.
146. See Fidler, supra note 33, at 300.
147. IHR Foreward, supra note 83.
148. Fidler, supra note 54, at 853.
149. Id. at 854.
150. See id. at 854-55.
151. See id. at 855-56.
152. Id. at 856.
153. Id.
154. Fidler, supra note 54, at 857.
[Vol. 10.1
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
Finally, the revised IHR may eliminate the provisions regulating
health resources at airports and ports, since the IHR actually overlaps with
other international agreements on this same topic.' Fidler argues that
removal of these provisions is dangerous because not all international
health agreements regulate infectious diseases as their sole priority and
any inconsistencies could prove to lower the amount of protection against
infectious diseases.5 6
Due to the effects of the current IHR, health scholars publicly express
their reservations about the effectiveness of the revised IHR. Many of
WHO's problems and specifically the usefulness of international health
legislation must be addressed in the context of the greater purpose,
117
structure, and goal of WHO as an international organization. While
beyond the scope of this segment on the IHR and revised IHR, WHO
faces challenges based on the lack of international enforcement authority,
financial constraints, and an ineffectively structured executive body limited
to medical knowledge, rather than international legal capacity.
Discussion of these topics is highly significant to the status of WHO and
will be addressed in Part IV.
B. Communications/Research
Significant emphasis on WHO's utilization of international authority
has been directed toward infectious disease control and the legislative
authority of the IHR. Yet commonly held understandings of health do not
relate to health care or personal good health. 9 The international impact
of health is not likely to be confronted solely with legislation or
vaccination. Part of WHO's mission includes maintaining communication
and research infrastructure, establishing health surveillance and
monitoring developments worldwide.' 60 As such, WHO's Constitution
requires that functional components of the organization:
(f) to establish and maintain such administrative and technical services
as may be required, including epidemiological and statistical services;
(j) to promote co-operation among scientific and professional groups
which contribute to the advancement of health;
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. See generally Fidler, supra note 1, at 1099-1103.
158. See id.
159. Taylor, supra note 7, at 310.
160. See THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1998, supra note 19, at 26-30 (discussing historical
and current policy trends of WHO's global response through communication and research).
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(n) to promote and conduct research in the field of health;
(p) to study and report on, in co-operation with other specialized
agencies where necessary, administrative and social techniques affecting
public health and medical care....'6'
There are a number of areas of research and communication where
'WHO effectively uses passive international authority for the betterment of
health. First, WHO facilitates the pharmaceutical industry with
"International Nonproprietary Names for pharmaceutical substances
(INNs)."' 62  Since pharmaceutical development and marketing reaches
nearly all global consumers, a consistent name in each language is essential
to maintain drug safety and communication among health professionals.163
Second, WHO monitors numerous sanitary factors worldwide and
publishes WHO Guidelines for drinking-water quality to facilitate water
sanitation, leads a joint Codex Alimentarius Commission to provide health
guidelines and maintain appropriate trade practices for food.
Furthermore, WHO implemented international regulatory legislation,
"International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes," which
ensures adequate nutrition for infants. Third, WHO serves as both an
international monitor and independent resource to the global community
for health in general.1 5 "From the earliest days of WHO, formal laboratory
networks were set up by the Organization for reference, exchange of
information and coordination of research programmes, particularly in the
area of vaccine research. . .. "'66 Finally, WHO organizes and maintains
global health statistics throughout the world.167 WHO publishes numerous
monthly and annual reports on global health conditions, including its
annual publication The World Health Report.'6 WHO disseminates health
information through all mediums including media and journal articles." 9
161. WHO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 2, 62 Stat. at 2681-82, 14 U.N.T.S. at 187-89.
162. THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1998, supra note 19, at 23.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 24.
165. See id. at 26.
166. Id. Since WHO's inception, "general programmes of work" have been formed to
achieve specific limited objectives in a certain area of health during a period of 4-6 years.
Thus far, nine of these general programmes of work have met and provided guidance in
strengthening national health services, coordinating health research, containing specific
health problems, and many other areas of global interest. See id. at 26-29.
167. See id. at 30.
168. See THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1998, supra note 19, at 30-31.
169. See id. at 34-35.
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Also, WHO provides access to its library and shares information in several
languages through the U.N. network of information distribution. 70
C. Application to Other Types of Law
The importance of global health is narrowly construed by western
thinkers. For non-scholarly audiences, health may be limited to the mere
individual. Even legal references define health as "'1. [t]he state of being
sound or whole in body, mind, or soul. 2. [flreedom from pain or
sickness."" a Yet these definitions do not encompass the dimensions of
global health worldwide. Health is dynamic and not static. As such, it
affects nearly every facet of international law in one way or another.7 A
full analysis of WHO's international impact on related areas of law would
be an infinite task. However, since the Constitution of WHO was
originally designed with some of these related fields in mind, a brief sketch
of their inescapable interdependence is relevant to WHO's historical
response and its ongoing legal impact.
1. Trade & Commerce Law
As noted earlier, international health law historically concerns itself
with protecting economic interests.'73 "International trade agreements that
liberalize trade between countries typically recognize that states may
restrict trade to protect human health.' 7 4 Nonetheless, health experts
caution that as products from international trade become so pervasive in
large economic markets, the ability to protect the public may become a
task that is not feasible.'75
Despite the overwhelming desire for nations to engage in
uninterrupted trade, health factors are one of the only factors to affect this
desire.176 The problem is enhanced when nations protect themselves from
health threats to an unnecessary or unreasonable extent. 7  Therefore,
"scientific disciplines exist to ensure that, when states enact health
measures restricting trade, the measures are really designed to protect
health and do not constitute protectionism disguised behind the fig leaf of
health.,,178
170. See id.
171. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 577 (7th ed. 2000).
172. Fidler, supra note 111, at 27.
173. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
174. Fidler, supra note 111, at 27.
175. Fidler, supra note 54, at 797.
176. See Fidler, supra note 111, at 27.
177. Id. at 28.
17& Id.
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Due to inadequate health conditions in many parts of the world,
international organizations have combined efforts to recognize health
concerns in trade.'79 For example, as a result of conflicts between the laws
of WHO, the World Trade Organization, and the Food and Agriculture
Organization, these influential organizations are attempting to reconcile
differences to ease international trade s" The binding regulations of each
organization are essential to foster their own goals, but they have the
potential to cause conflicts since each organization has a unique focus."'
The goal of meetings between the organizations is to find a way to
implement the goals of all three organizations without conflicting with
international trade.8 2 This is but one example of the growing need for
international collaboration due to interdependent goals of nations and
international law.
2. Environmental Law
WHO has directly and indirectly affected environmental law
worldwide as health specialists realize that human health concerns are
inevitably the result of human acts."3 Most notably, urbanization in
developing countries facilitates many of the factors that inhibit the
betterment of individual and group health.'4 As a result of the rush to
urban settings, poverty has befallen countless individuals. 85 "[L]imited
successes in improving housing and living conditions, including the
provision of safe and sufficient water supplies and adequate sanitation and
drainage" are some of the problems associated with impoverished
communities in emerging metropolises throughout the world.' These
conditions are just ripe for the proliferation of infectious diseases.'
Environmental conditions have high correlation to specific diseases such as
malaria and schistosomiasis.'
179. See World Health Organization, Revision of the International Health Regulations:
Public Health and Trade, WHO WKLY. EPIDEM. REC., June 25, 1999, at 193, available at
http://www.who.int/wer/pdf/1999/wer7425.pdf.
180. See id. The specific legal agreements being debated are: the IHR that pertains to
WHO, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures of the World Trade Organization, and the
Codex Alimentarius of the Food and Agriculture Commission. Id.
181. See id. at 201.
182. Id.
183. See Fidler, supra note 54, at 801-02.
184. See id. at 806-08.
185. THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1998, supra note 19, at 121.
186. Id.




WHO addressed environmental dilemmas over the past several
decades through various programs. 89 For example, the aforementioned
International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation guidelines instruct
developing nations on appropriate procedures in rising populations.
Additionally, WHO coordinates with nations in their own environmental
legislation with:
Conferences of health and environment ministries convened by WHO
in the Americas, Eastern Mediterranean and Europe have been
instrumental in accelerating the process, and agreements have been
reached on deadlines for completing such plans. For example, in
Europe, by the end of 1997 more than 50% of all countries had
prepared national environmental health action plans.9
Beyond local regulations, WHO is responsive to highly sensitive
topics that could be very costly to Member States yet undoubtedly concern
the health of nations. WHO tested the international powers designated
under its Constitution when it realized health systems could not handle a
nuclear war catastrophe. 9' The WHO committee that handled the issue of
a nuclear catastrophe concluded that WHO should take an affirmative role
by submitting to the International Court of Justice a request for an
advisory opinion on whether the use of nuclear weapons would violate
international law and the WHO Constitution.9 This action by WHO is
controversial because the historical actions of WHO relate to more
traditional health issues and acting in its advisory role by making proposals
rather than an affirmative regulatory role. 93 Due to heavy internal and
194
external criticism of such a heated issue, WHO is likely to resist taking
such dramatic action in the near future.
3. Tobacco Legislation
The scientific community no longer disputes that tobacco and tobacco
smoke have destructive health consequences.9 In fact, smoking claims
189. See generally id. at 128 (discussing various international conferences and resolutions
to regional governments to improve environmental conditions).
190. Id. at 128-29.
191. Martin M. Strahan, Comment, Nuclear Weapons, The World Health Organization,
and the International Court of Justice: Should an Advisory Opinion Bring Them Together? 2
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 395, 397 (1995).
192. See id. at 402.
193. Id. at 406.
194. See generally id. at 400-01 (outlaying the debates between delegates of the World
Health Assembly on whether the issue was within the competence of the WHO
Constitution).
195. Taylor, supra note 42, at 258.
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three million premature deaths every year,196  making "tobacco
consumption a uniquely important public health crisis calling for national
and international action." 197 The World Health Assembly enacted
numerous resolutions over the past thirty years to prioritize tobacco
control among WHO's Member States and to strengthen collaboration
between WHO, nongovernmental organizations, and other U.N.
organizations."" In 1990, WHO adopted the 'Tobacco or Health
Programme' which aims at working with Member States to provide advice
and support to develop national tobacco regulations,'99 but WHO Member
States have not adopted or implemented tobacco control laws thus far.sm
°
Due to the growing public awareness of tobacco,20' WHO is pursuing
international legislation as a means to limit the effects of tobacco
worldwide.20 Whether WHO or the U.N. should spearhead international
strategy and legislation for tobacco control is debatable to the World
Health Assembly.2°3 WHO is the favorable entity because "WHO has the
legal authority and public health expertise to serve as the platform for the
development of an international regulatory approach to tobacco
control." 4 The United Nations General Assembly also has the legal
capacity to create tobacco control regulations, yet it neither has the
expertise nor the time to engage in negotiating the complexities and
technical issues that international tobacco regulations necessitate,
especially as it affects public health, a topic that is supervised by WHO.
WHO will meet significant challenges fostering an international
response to tobacco. At least 120 countries produce tobacco and domestic
consumption alone is a large source of tax revenue.' 6 For example, in the
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 279-80.
199. Id. at 280.
200. Id. at 258.
201. Taylor, supra note 42, at 258.
202. Id. This represents radical change to the ideology of WHO. WHO has consistently
been seen as a conservative organization when it comes to using its legal strategies. Id. at
282. But because crisis stimulates international attention, "WHO's unconventional
consideration of the role that international law and institutions can play in promoting world
public health protection policies suggests that WHO's leaders may be rethinking and
expanding the organization's traditional scientific, technical approaches to international
health." Id.
203. Id. at 283.
204. Id. at 281.
205. Id. at 297.
206. Id. at 274. The misguided belief by many countries is that tobacco production is a
necessary benefit to the national economy. Yet, the "social costs of tobacco production and
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United States, Phillip Morris alone paid $12.9 billion in taxes to the
government in 1993.207 It seems questionable whether WHO, an
organization with an annual budget of $1.8 billion,2 can counter
transnational tobacco conglomerates with extensive economic and political
power 09 such as Phillip Morris.
Since tobacco control is a politically sensitive issue10 and countries are• • 21!
resistant to sacrifice autonomy to international organizations, WHO may
need to adopt a strategy over time that will gradually increase
governmental concern to a point where countries will support national and• • . .. 212
international tobacco legislation."2 The first step in such a strategy is for
WHO to encourage passage of a nonbinding intergovernmental resolution
by the United Nations General Assembly. 213 "WHO should adopt this
strategy to heighten global concern about tobacco control in member
states and to promote support for the development of a binding
international convention on tobacco containment., 214  Adopting a
nonbinding resolution will not demand immediate legal commitments,
rather, use of simplified procedures in the U.N. General Assembly (that
work quicker than formal multilateral treaties) will raise international
attention to the issue rapidly."'
With the continuous and systemic approach of normative
international standards through U.N. resolutions, WHO may develop a
global political consensus for binding international standards on tobacco
216
control. Since a political consensus for global tobacco control would be
217difficult, a comprehensive and detailed treaty would likely be
ineffective."" Instead, "WHO could encourage states to adopt a
consumption include the costs of environmental pollution, deforestation, and most
important, tobacco related mortality and morbidity." Id. at 274-75 (footnotes omitted).
Medical costs to American society in 1984 were estimated at $53 billion due to tobacco-
related causes. Id. at 275.
207. Taylor, supra note 42, at 263.
20& Proposed Programme Budget, supra note 42, at 3.
209. Taylor, supra note 42, at 285.
210. Id. at 284.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 286. Tobacco regulation remains weak in many developing countires. Id. at
273. The lack of effective domestic regulations provides a ripe target for transnational
tobacco countries and provides even more support for international action. Id. at 274.
213. Taylor, supra note 42, at 287-88.
214. Id. at 288.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 292.
217. Id. at 293.
218. Id. at 293-94.
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comprehensive convention, mandating that states enact extensive tobacco
control regulations that encompass all of WHO's recommendations for the
last twenty-five years....""9
This strategy is more politically feasible and embodies the convention-
protocol approach.2 Distinguishable from a treaty, this approach does
. .221
not resolve every facet of the problem in a single instrument. The
international framework sets the broad goals and parties to the agreement
will ideally establish specific ways to implement the goals.22' This dynamic
approach should be facilitated by WHO because it has broad legal
authority to encourage Members States to implement "recommendations
or convention . . . to any matter within the competence of the
organization.
V. THE GREAT DEBATE OF WHO'S INTERNATIONAL POWER
The review of WHO shows its responsibility for an area of civilization
with far-reaching implications. Health encompasses more than absence of
224physical illness and well-being. It encompasses more than a fundamental
responsibility by the global community.25 The implications of health could
easily be debated far beyond any concise definition. Yet the
implementation of WHO's health policies in the global community must
be systematically and intricately reviewed. While WHO's contributions to
global health are significant, they are often overshadowed by observers
who desire a more active WHO legalistic response.226
A. Significant Legal Contributions
WHO's significant legal contributions derive from its international
composition to specific internal policies. First, WHO is the most dynamic
219. Taylor, supra note 42, at 294.
220. id. The convention-protocol approach has been successful in implementing
international agreements on environmental matters. In 1979, the "Convention on the
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals" used this approach. Other successes
using this approach are: "the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, the




223. Id. at 297.
224. See Taylor, supra note 7, at 310.
225. Jamar, supra note 5, at 67.
226. See generally Fidler, supra note 1, at 1107-1115 (recognizing philosophical and
practical deficiencies in WHO's international legal activity).
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and influential health power to date.22' However, its leverage on Member
States can largely be attributed to its organizational legitimacy.2 1 The
Member States create this legitimacy because the collective mentality
comprises mutual individual values.229 Most WHO Member States identify
with the goals of the organization, which in turn provides stability for the
collective against negative influence.Y0 Furthermore, WHO's recognition
as a global health leader facilitates individual nations' health policies and
supports WHO's own policies 31  "WHO's country programs involve
working directly with individual ministries of health, thereby strengthening
the nations' capacity to plan, analyze, monitor, and manage available state
resources in conformity with domestic Health for All strategies.,
23 2
Goodwill and cooperation between government leaders and WHO
officials further legitimate to the impact of WHO's trusted name.33 Even
many non-governmental health agencies admit their own accomplishments
are largely rooted on WHO's constitutionally mandated policies and
programs of coordinating international health work.3
Second, WHO's passage of the IHR was a remarkable step in
international legal authority over previous treaty-based agreements. 235 The
theory behind the IHR gave the World Health Assembly the ability to
maintain current scientific standards in the IHR without having to
236continually resort to cumbersome treaty changes. Certainly, the
discussions in this comment thus far have described the subsequent
revelation of the IHR's ineffectiveness. However, in an attempt to learn
from its historical errors, the proposed revisions are hopeful to correct its
ineffectiveness and "continue to serve the principles under which they
were conceived. 37  The failures of the IHR are undeniable but the
founding philosophy behind them is nevertheless still alive.
227. See Taylor, supra note 42, at 278-79.
228. Taylor, supra note 7, at 320.
229. Id. at 320-21.
230. Id. at 321.
231. Id. at 321-22.
232. Id. at 322.
233. Id.
234. Taylor, supra note 7, at 322.
235. Fidler, supra note 54, at 836.
236. Id.
237. The International Response to Epidemics and Applications of the International Health
Regulations: Report of a WHO Informal Consultation 13, WHO Doc. WHO/EMC/IHR/96.1
(Dec. 11-14, 1995), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/1996/WHO-EMCIHR_96.1.
pdf.
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B. Criticism of WHO's Limited Approach
1. International Legal Philosophy
It is a well-known principle that "[i]nternational law... lacks its own
'muscle'; its own ability to force the parties to do something that they don't
want to do., 238 WHO is not immune from this principle because it cannot
even sanction Member States who do not comply with its binding
regulations. 39 So what is the background of this conception that
international law lacks muscle and how does that impact international
enforceability of policies? Two broad schools of thought offer differing
perspectives on international law. One school believes a formalized
central system of enforcement is required to attain international law; the
other school views the current informal norms observed by nations as a
subtle attainment of international order.24' The global community desires
that international law bring both peace and prosperity for the attainment
242of common human goals. 
Certainly more people find their lives twisted by the effects of poverty
than by the direct effects of war. The effects include the health
consequences of malnutrition and preventable diseases, the
psychological costs of illiteracy, the physical burden of constant labor
just to earn enough to stay alive, and the general emotional sense of
fatalism and disempowerment that often accompanies the awareness
that, through no fault of one's own, one's life is destined to be very hard
indeed.243
International law provides a forum for the discussion of common
issues among nations.24 This is highly representative of the fact that WHO
and other international health organizations were created for their ability
to deal with common international trade and commerce impairments
caused by health-related issues.2 ' Ideally, modern international legal
regimes still operate under this cooperative theme where the mutual needs
of nations intersect and international law is the consensus of mutual
238. Lea Brilmayer, International Justice and International Law, 98 W. VA. L. REv. 611,
622 (1996).
239. Fidler, supra note 54, at 848.
240. Brilmayer, supra note 238, at 612.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 615.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 620.
245. See Fidler, supra note 1, at 1083-84.
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interests.2 6 However, when countries fail to comply with international
standards, the "application of pressure" is a legal strategy that may be
247
available. Sanctions assessed by other international actors make
compliance with international law more desirable due to the increased cost
of sanctions 48  "Sanctions can include trade boycotts; withdrawing
ambassadors; banning a violator from participation in international sports,
scientific, or cultural activities; refusing to sign an unrelated agreement
that the violator wants; and various other signs of international
disapproval." 249 The theory of sanctions is only beneficial to the extent
that those who enforce the sanctions will not incur costs to themselves.s5
Often, sanctions are very hurtful to international actors.21 For example,
trade sanctions during the Persian Gulf War severely injured the
economies of surrounding nations.
The only other alternative to the aforementioned approaches to the
211implementation of international law is direct force. 3  Skeptics of
international law emphasize that international legal institutions have little
power to "directly enforce international decisions, 254 enhancing WHO's
view to avoid the use of law to effectuate its ends.255 Truly uncooperative
nations know that the use of direct force is scarcely used and will often
take the chance of violating international law knowing that no force is
256likely to be inflicted on them. Direct force was taken to an exceptional
level during the Persian Gulf War as nations united to protect Kuwait and
economic oil interests. 217 It is interesting to note that by the United
Nations Charter discouraging use of direct force to enforce international
law, the international community has essentially "deprived itself of a very
forceful remedy for international wrongs." 8
246. Brilmayer, supra note 238, at 621.
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254. Id. (emphasis added).
255. Taylor, supra note 42, at 282.
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257. Id. at 624.
258. Id. at 625.
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2. Implementation Problems
Beyond the above-mentioned principles of weak international legal
structure, WHO has not effectively exercised its legal muscle under
Articles 19 and 21 of the WHO Constitution.29 The scope of WHO's
international legal authority under Article 19 authorizes WHO to "have
authority to adopt conventions or agreements with respect to any matter
within the competence of the Organization."'2 6  Given the lengthy
functional provisions of WHO under Article 2, Article 19 provides WHO
with overwhelming legal powers. Nevertheless, WHO has not utilized its
• 261
broad powers in many facets of its policy implementation. The most
obvious example is that international health directives possess no
262
enforcement powers, a victim of the aforementioned international legal
philosophy. Violations of binding health law can only be remedied within
the powers of dispute settlement procedures established by WHO.
26
Unfortunately, since Members States rarely use dispute settlement
procedures, the creation of international health law can be characterized as
unenforced recommendations, at best.2
3. Internal/Structural Problems
While WHO suffers from macro-level problems such as the effects of
international legal philosophy as well as constitutional implementation of
its power, WHO also receives criticism for its limited organizational make-
up. First, no WHO permanent or part-time staff members has primary
responsibility for public international legal issues.265 Legal counsel for
WHO constantly responds to legal matters of the Executive Board and the
World Health Assembly,' 66 yet WHO lacks a formal legal office that works
with the Director-General to assure integration of WHO policy as
267international law. It has also been suggested that to foster its legal
capacity, WHO should establish legal links with other specialized agencies
• 268
of the U.N. that have experience with international legal involvement.
There is high expectation that "[i]ncreasing WHO's international legal
259. See Fidler, supra note 54, at 837.
260. WHO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 19, 62 Stat. at 2685, 14 U.N.T.S. at 192.
261. See generally Fidler, supra note 1, at 1089-1095 (discussing examples of WHO's
failure to respond to global health with international regulations).
262. Id. at 1090.
263, Id.; see also Fidler, supra note 54, at 848.
264. Fidler, supra note 1, at 1090-91.
265. Id. at 1112.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1113.
268. Id. at 1114.
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activity beyond the revised IHR and the tobacco control convention will
demand even more international legal commitment from WHO" in the
future.
Despite external pressures, WHO remains reluctant to develop
international legal regimes beyond its response to global infectious
270disease. In 1989, even WHO's legal counsel reasoned that international
law was an ineffective tool to deal with global health problems since
international law is often too slow to deal with rapidly evolving health
concerns.27' However, in recent years, the validity of that reasoning has
been undermined with increased volume and the accelerated speed at
which global health problems grow worldwide.17' Additionally, the logic of
WHO's General Counsel fails because the root of WHO's very existence is
based on international law and international relations. The powers of
WHO come from its Constitution, which is backed by U.N. legislation.
Through international legal power, WHO can transform international
214public health if it so desires.
A major reason for WHO's resistance to engage in international lawS271
and policy-making comes from its medical philosophy. WHO's personnel
276is dominated by professionals trained in public health and medicine.
This background "produces an ethos that looks at global health problems
as medical-technical issues to be resolved by the application of the healing
arts., 277  A medical-technical approach does not facilitate the use of
international law, but rather it advocates that local and national medical
•. .• 2711
resources, not law, can resolve health situations.
VI. THE FUTURE: GLOBAL HEALTH JURISPRUDENCE
The background of how and why WHO has become what it is has
been laid out in the preceding sections. Many scholars point out the
weaknesses and rationales for WHO's actions and inactions pertaining to
international health law. Much focus has been directed at legislation, but
269. Id. at 1109.
270. Fidler, supra note 1, at 1106.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1107.
273. Id.
274. See id.
275. Id. at 1099.
276. Fidler, supra note 1, at 1099.
277. Id. (footnote omitted).
278. Id.
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it is naive to place reliance solely on international legislation by WHO.279
Michel Bdlanger believes that the general objective of international health
law "is to support, guide, and coordinate national health law."w
Achieving such a legal framework in a globalized world is fundamental to
the emerging philosophy of global health jurisprudence."' "Global health
jurisprudence can be defined as that body of rules, strategies, and
procedures that allows law in all its forms to support public health. The
objective of developing a global health jurisprudence is to identify
concepts, standards, and approaches that best promote public health."'2
It is undeniable that the complexities of global health jurisprudence is
due to vast diversity among the world's cultures, but global health
jurisprudence aims to create a common discourse how law and health
relate to one another.! Such a discourse is rooted in numerous
international agreements and lawss but only WHO, as the recognized
281
advocate for world health, can develop it into a global paradigm.
David Fidler has been one of the staunchest advocates of global
health jurisprudence and offers a four-part rationale for its
286implementation. First, the public health context is so broad that an
effective framework of rules and strategies is essential."' Second, the
theoretical framework is based on the interdependence of national and
international law as an integrated system.m Third, this national and
international interdependence reflects the desire of public health experts
and legal experts for the need to cooperate at all levels." 9 Finally, global
health jurisprudence will not be solely interdependent on laws, but it will
include state and non-state actors such as public and private organizations,
transnational corporations, and governments who implement global health
279. Fidler, supra note 1, at 1116.
280. Michel B6langer, The Future of International Health Legislation, 40 INT'L DIG.
HEALTH LEGIS. 1, 2 (1989).
281. See Fidler, supra note 172, at 52.
282. Fidler, supra note 1, at 1117.
283. Id.
284. Id. Global health jurisprudence will be reflective of "treaties, international
regulations, international recommendations and standards, international soft law norms,
customary international law, national statutes and administrative regulations, and cases
settling disputes." Id.
285. Id.






at all levels.2'9 These rationales are a bit simplistic of the global health
jurisprudence ideals but are recurrent themes throughout a discussion of
the concept.
While global health jurisprudence is legal in nature, it is more
accurately described as forming global public health policy.291  Global
public health policy does not come without a price. Traditional sovereign
states need to rethink territorial-based governance to adapt to a more
292
relevant global frameworkY. Creation of global policy requires a
partnership between state and non-state actors to answer the ongoing
challenges faced by countries.' 9'
Cooperation to achieve global health jurisprudence requires the
development of both horizontal and vertical relationships.294 "[V]ertical
relationships among international organizations, states, and NGOs [non-
governmental organizations and] . horizontal relationships between
,295international organizations, governments, and non-state actors," makes
public health a legal and political matter through every facet of
international relations.296  By recognizing vertical and horizontal
relationships, global health jurisprudence will benefit from these same
relationships in other areas of law such as trade, labor, and environmental
law that already recognize health as an important value.292
Global health jurisprudence will inevitably improve WHO's
international legal capacity to achieve its goals, but the only strategy to
actually implement international law and policy is through the support of
national law.' 9s International law often sparks reform in domestic law,
both in advanced and developing countries to attain accepted international
standards,299 but international legal instruments need the power of national
legal capacity.3 ° Global health jurisprudence recognizes that national legal
reform that acts without consideration of global consequences defies the
purpose of the ideology. 0' For example, national legal measures that
290. Id. at 52-53.
291. Fidler, supra note 1, at 1118.
292. Id.
293. Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Global Public Policy, FOREIGN AFF. 127, 132 (Nov./Dec.
1997).
294. See Fidler, supra note 1, at 1119; see also Fidler, supra note 111, at 55.
295. Fidler, supra note 1, at 1119; see also Fidler, supra note 111, at 55.
296. Fidler, supra note 111, at 55.
297. Id.
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resulted in settlements in U.S. tobacco cases failed to recognize adverse
effects on other countries."
An objective that is central to global health jurisprudence is to find
ways that the complexities of law can effectively support public health.l3
This will occur through regulatory and legislative approaches that support
health policy.3°4 "As legal experts have made clear, national and
international law are critical of creating the rules, structures, authority, and
procedures needed for governments to protect and promote public
health."30 5 Implementing such rules, structures, authority, and procedures
for the benefit of public health will involve health experts, lawyers, and
scientists because global health jurisprudence is interdisciplinary."' A
formula of rules and procedures will certainly not create legal harmony to
all problems of global health due to diversity from place to place, but the
common discourse between law and health will benefit ongoing acceptance
of the philosophy of global health jurisprudence.' 7
In summary, global health jurisprudence recognizes that society's
needs demand more knowledge and skills in law and public health since
the impact of health has become a global issue.3°s  Global health
jurisprudence seeks to: (1) increase the knowledge and skills relating to
law and health, (2) provide a means "to foster the science and
philosophy of public health law locally, nationally, and globally,, 310 and (3)
implement interdependent bodies of law at national and international
levels.311
VII. CONCLUSION
A fundamental right to health exists in the world that gives other
rights meaning and value. The right to health is broader than other
rights because it touches on "many fundamental aspects of social welfare
and even ultimately what it means to be human." '313 Yet achievements in
302. Fidler, supra note 111, at 54.




307. Id. at 53-54.
308. Fidler, supra note 111, at 56.
309. Id.
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313. Id. at 58 (footnote omitted).
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global health are overwhelmed by the burden of disease on the world's
disadvantaged populations.3 14 As the globalization of health issues reach
countless areas of humanity,315 international law must now incorporate the
value of health not only for the health of individuals but also for the health
of populations and the planet as well." 6
WHO plays a crucial role in promoting health policies and fostering
universal access to health.317 WHO attempts to encourage the principle
that "[t]he enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of
the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race,
religion, political belief, economic or social condition.""3 WHO's legal
ability to enact international legislation and recommendations under the
WHO Constitution gives the organization broad legal authority to any
matter within its scope."' WHO spends much of its resources in an effort
to combat ongoing and newly emerging infectious disease throughout the
world, 20 yet the IHR and other legal maneuvers are too limited in scope to
make a significant difference. While the revised IHR provide some hope
of increased effectiveness and protection for the future, there is still an
aura of doubt that its provisions will actually beat the ongoing and deadly
threat of infectious disease.
WHO's responsibilities are not solely limited to international health
legislation. In addition to its research and communication of health
matters worldwide to Member States, WHO directly and indirectly affects
how health is an integral part of other legal matters. Member States' trade
and commerce woefully yield to human health concerns"' because
32historically health crises impaired the economic well-being of States.
Likewise, environmental concerns resulting from urbanization and poverty
demand an even greater response to meet the health standards of the
world. Finally, WHO is gaining strength in the battle of international
tobacco control. Fostering international policy on tobacco will require a
delicate balance with nations' autonomy,323 yet WHO can prepare a
314. THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1999, supra note 70, at 13.
315. See Fidler, supra note 111, at 10.
316. Id. at 26.
317. Taylor, supra note 7, at 303.
318. WHO Constitution, supra note 3, pmbl., 62 Stat. at 2680, 14 U.N.T.S. at 186.
319. See WHO Constitution, supra note 3, arts. 19-23, 62 Stat. at 2685, 14 U.N.T.S. at 192-
93.
320. See generally THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1998, supra note 19, at 49-57.
321. Fidler, supra note 111, at 27.
322. See Fidler, supra note 1, at 1083.
323. Taylor, supra note 42, at 284.
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common tobacco control doctrine that will be applicable despite cultural
and health differences.324
Despite WHO's efforts to attain more effective health measures and a
right to health throughout the world, it is still susceptible to greater
demands than WHO should fulfill alone. As an international organization,
its powers are generally limited to indirect pressures on a violator of
international policy as opposed to direct force to ensure compliance with
the goals of the majority."' It is understandable then that WHO limits its
legislative powers to act on controversial issues since the global populous
can so easily refuse to abide by a particular directive. However, a change
in WHO's international policy-handling requires internal refinement away
from a solely a medical perspective2 6 and encouragement of its legal
potential through policy-making.
WHO must take a more effective approach to global health problems
because of the unique forum it provides, especially its legal framework.327
Due to WHO's past failures to utilize its unique international capacity, an
effective framework of global health jurisprudence is required. Global
health jurisprudence must encompass interaction between national and
328international law between state actors, non-state actors, and
international organizations on health priorities to achieve a cooperative,
unilateral direction to better serve the health needs of the global
community.
This comment has outlined the progress and setbacks of global health
and WHO. In a recent speech before the American Public Health
Association, Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland cited nearly all of these very
issues discussed herein as significant to the continuing challenges of
WHO. 33 Important health issues not only reflect external actors' concerns
but also show recognition by WHO's leadership to rectify problems that
inhibit health. Also, World Health Report 2001 focuses attention solely on
new mental health concerns and the dangers that will persist if it continues
324. Id. at 296-97.
325. See Brilmayer, supra note 238, at 629-30.
326. See Fidler, supra note 1, at 1099-1100.
327. Taylor, supra note 7, at 345.
328. Fidler, supra note 1, at 1116.
329. See Fidler, supra note 111, at 55.
330. See Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland, Address by Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland to
American Public Health Association Annual Meeting - "One World: Global Health"
(October 22, 2001), available at http://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/2001/
english/20011022_aphaatlanta.en.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2002).
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to go untreated. 3 1 This recognition by WHO shows that the scope of
global health does not diminish; it continues to enlarge. Past problems are
still present, and the problems of today are likely to be here in the future.
WHO will have to expand the scope of its power, policy, and legal capacity
to deal with evolving global health. However, while WHO may be the
channel for global health concerns, the advocates of global health
jurisprudence are correct that an interaction between national and
international law through state actors, non-state actors, and international
organizations, specifically WHO, are essential to deal with the future of
global health. WHO has a duty as reflected herein to promote the highest
level of health for all people but strengthening its philosophy through
mutual international cooperation of nations is the only way to achieve an
acceptable global level of health for all.
331. See THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2001:
MENTAL HEALTH: NEW UNDERSTANDING, NEW HOPE (2001), available at
http://www.who.int/whr/2001/main/enlpdf/index.htm.
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